The bungled response to the Pathankot attack underscores the
need for a three-pronged revamp: parliamentary oversight, a well-defined
national security doctrine and an independent federal commission of
accountability.
Most
terror attacks in India are characterised by three critical missteps: ignored
intelligence inputs, inconsistent security response, and heavy casualties.
Consider,
for instance, the Pathankot and the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks. A few days
before the boat with terrorists actually landed in Mumbai, the Intelligence
Bureau had details of the specific location of a satellite phone used by
terrorists on a boat moving towards the Mumbai coast. In the run-up to the
attacks, there were at least two more specific alerts Indian agencies had about
a possible attack on Mumbai.
After 166 people were killed,
hundreds injured, and India held to ransom for days and
humiliated on the global stage by 10 terrorists, no one was held accountable.
Those who were supposed to act on the terror alerts, those who were supposed to
guard the seas and those who were supposed to protect Mumbai, all carried on
with their professional lives.
In Pathankot the story just got
worse. The U.S. agencies had alerted their Indian counterparts
around Christmas about a group of half-a-dozen terrorists planning to target
the city. By early morning of January 1, a senior police officer reported his
ordeal with the terrorists. Despite several hours available to intercept the
terrorists in a limited space, New Delhi, in its wisdom, decided to waste time
by flying in National Security Guard (NSG) commandos from the national capital,
while thousands of trained army soldiers were already stationed all over
Pathankot.
As with
26/11, the criminal neglect by those responsible for acting on the information
would again be whitewashed. The Central government would again come to the
conclusion that no one was responsible for the lapses that resulted in the
humiliating attack and the mismanaged counterterror operation.
In all
of its contemporary history, India has only been going around in a loop in its
inability to tackle armed non-state actors. Jaish-e-Mohammad, the
Pakistan-based terror group suspected to be behind the
Pathankot attack, was founded by Masood Azhar, who was one of the three
terrorists freed by India in yet another embarrassing episode of terrorism on
another year-end: on December 31, 1999, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided to release three terrorists after
Indian Airlines flight IC814 was hijacked to Kandahar, to secure the lives of
the passengers.
Reshaping
India’s security posture
Though
India’s wars with neighbouring countries have played the most important role in
impacting its security posture, terrorism has, in fact, been the biggest threat
faced by the country on almost all major counts — the number of soldiers
killed, duration of engagement with armed movements or the spread of the
menace. However, terrorism hasn’t had a commensurate impact on reshaping
India’s security posture and tactics, as well as political strategies.
That
might explain why India has one of the poorest track records in tackling
insurgencies. Various studies have shown that insurgencies with external
support tend to linger on longer than purely domestic movements. Broad
assessments of armed conflicts since World War II show that their average time
span is just over four years. A RAND Corporation assessment of 89 armed
movements said that they last for approximately 10 years on average; the
government’s chances of winning a civil war keep improving as the armed
movement becomes protracted. In India, none of those statistics seem to work.
The Naga insurgency is as old as independent India, several other northern
movements are several decades old, and Kashmir militancy started in the late
1980s. One can attribute their longevity to the role of neighbouring countries
such as Pakistan and China in fomenting these movements, but it is a futile
blame game considering the limited diplomatic options available to rein in
those countries. Besides, practical statecraft will acknowledge that the use of
non-state actors for tactical and strategic aims across the border is
commonplace. Every battlefield, from Bangladesh in 1971, where the Mukti Bahini
militia was armed and trained by India, to the present battlefield of Syria,
where the U.S. and other international powers are arming militias, has similar
stories.
Even-handed
approach needed
However,
there is a second aspect of terrorism/insurgency that can be better calibrated.
At the core of the state response should be a well-delineated national security
doctrine and security strategy. And the doctrine has to be placed firmly on
constitutional values, especially equality before law. Addressing grievances of
various groups and dealing with all wrongdoers with the same force of law is
critical in this fight against terrorism. Successive governments have failed
that test. When political expediency prevails over constitutional duties, the
state cannot expect to defeat terrorism.
In the
encounter killing of Sohrabuddin Sheikh, or the terror cases of Malegaon,
Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid, etc., the state’s prosecution has been
differential and has varied depending on the government in power. The Central
Bureau of Investigation and the National Investigation Agency are actively used
as tools of the government of the day. Indeed, the Narendra Modi government is
not writing out any fresh instructive manuals for Indian democracy, but only
carrying on with the expedient practices mastered by successive Congress
regimes and other coalition governments. This must end, if the Indian state is
serious about fighting terrorism.
Political
misuse of state organs and the complete lack of transparency in their
operations have resulted in Indian intelligence agencies emerging as obscure
centres obfuscating facts or exaggerating things, mostly to impress political
masters or for other vested interests. The lack of accountability has also
meant that field operations of intelligence agencies are mostly cottage
industries run on fake sources or exaggerated claims. Underlying all of it is
the significant financial benefits. The final result is that even when genuine
intelligence alerts are available, they are not acted upon with seriousness.
Most intelligence alerts of Indian agencies actually read like fantasy stories
from unbridled minds. Most often, they are merely that.
Pathankot has shred to pieces the
cycle of terror responses in India: from processing
intelligence alerts, mobilising first responders, carrying out counterterror
operations under a well-defined command-and-control system, minimising
casualties and, finally, obtaining maximum intelligence to thwart possible
future attacks. The raid on the airbase has shown that terror responses cannot
be left to the whims and fancies of a few individuals, however lionised they
are. It has yet again highlighted the fact that India still does not have a
laid-down policy response to its biggest security threat.
A
documented security doctrine
It is
time to finally accept the reality and move forward on a broad sweep of reforms
in the security establishment. This could be done at three levels —
parliamentary oversight, a well-defined national security doctrine and a
national security strategy to implement the doctrine, and, finally, an
independent federal commission of accountability on security matters.
There
have been several discussions about improving the accountability of
intelligence agencies and other federal organisations responsible for the
security of the country. Many experts are apprehensive of an adverse effect of
parliamentarians being given oversight of intelligence agencies. However, the
fact is that there is no better accountability system possible. The diversity
of Indian politics will ensure there is robust oversight, and that the
mechanism is not held hostage by a few vested interests in Parliament.
As many
experts recommend, it is time for India to have a documented
national security doctrine, like the Constitution, so that
successive governments do not forget the fact that they are mere custodians of
an idea called India, and not revolutionaries mandated with recreating the
nation-state. The tweaking of India’s security concerns, based on their limited
understandings and jingoistic or pacifist persuasions, has had a terribly
adverse impact. When I.K. Gujral became the prime minister, he shut down
India’s covert capabilities abroad in the simplistic assumption that it would
bring peace; by rushing in the NSG to Pathankot and ignoring the huge Army
capabilities available in the vicinity, the Modi government miserably
mismanaged the operations in the airbase.
Standard
response protocols
The
doctrine should be accompanied by a security strategy that should spell out the
state response to various kinds of security challenges. If it is a terrorist
strike, then the decision-makers must know the responses expected of them, and
not try to improvise based on their limited awareness. Command and control for
such operations should also be spelt out in the document.
Finally,
and most importantly, India must constitute a very credible, and permanent, federal commission of
accountability on security matters. This is important not just
to bring in accountability to the security establishment, but also to ensure
that the many insurgencies and terrorist challenges do not result in the
intelligence and security apparatus getting a free hand to misuse their powers.
Such a commission can also be a watchdog in places like Kashmir and the
Northeast, where repeated allegations of human rights violations are haunting
political efforts to find peace, and feeding terrorism.
India,
and its security forces, can’t any more trust the wisdom of a few wise men to
tackle terror threats, secure our assets and safeguard national interests. The
first step is to write down what the rulers of the day should do when a terror
threat occurs.
josy.joseph@thehindu.co.in
Veto power
to the terrorist?
Terror
strikes in India are uncomfortably closer than ever to major developments in
the fragile relationship between India and Pakistan:
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1
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December 25, 2015: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore
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2
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January 2, 2016: Attack on Pathankot airbase
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3
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July 10, 2015: Narendra Modi and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz
Sharif meet in Ufa, Russia
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4
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July 27, 2015: Three gunmen infiltrate into Punjab; seven people killed,
includes a superintendent of police
|
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5
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Nov.-Dec. 2014: Jammu & Kashmir elections underway; Mr. Modi addresses
rally in Srinagar on December 8
|
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6
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November 27, 2014: SAARC summit in Nepal; Mr. Modi and Mr. Sharif shake
hands, Indian Prime Minister visits Jammu a day later
|
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7
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November 27, 2014: Encounter in Arnia sector, Jammu; 12 people killed
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8
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September 26, 2013: Twelve people, including a Lieutenant Colonel, die in two
militant attacks on police and Army formations in Kathua and Samba districts.
First major attack in Jammu province in almost a decade.
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9
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September 29, 2013: First meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
recently elected Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of
the UN General Assembly in New York
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10
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Jun 24, 2013: Eight Army jawans killed and 19 others injured in ambush
near Hyderpora area on the outskirts of Srinagar
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11
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June 25, 2013: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi visit the
Kashmir Valley
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